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THE ARIZONA LABOR DECISION
In Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 4 2 Sup. Ct. 124, the Court held uncon-
stitutional an Arizona Statute limiting the use of injunctions in labor
disputes. So many and so important are the questions raised by this
case that it is possible within the limits of a short discussion to call
attention to some of the more important issues only.
The case is thrown into sharper relief by the decision of the same
Court only two weeks earlier in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Trades Council (1921) 42 Sup. Ct. 72, upholding the almost identical
provisions of the Clayton Act.- The decision in the principal case is
'Act of Oct. 15, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 73o, 738).
There is one distinction important on the point of due process between the
Arizona Statute (Ariz. Civil Code, 1913, par. 1464) and the Clayton Act, supra, for
the latter has the provision, not contained in the former: "nor shall any of the
acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law
of the United States." Sec. 2o. The Clayton Act was construed in Duplex Co.
v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct 172. Similar statutes exist in other
states. Wash. Laws, I919, ch. 185; Or. Laws, i919, ch. 34
6
, upheld in Green-
[408]
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made to rest upon the construction given the Arizona Statute by the
Arizona Supreme Court. In discussing the case our interest must
necessarily center about the majority opinion of Chief justice Taft, but
mention should be made of the three noteworthy dissenting opinions.
Justice Holmes again calls attention to the dangers of a "delusive
exactness" in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
need of "social experiments" in "the insulated chambers afforded by
the several states, even though the experiments may seem futile or
even noxious" to us; Justice Pitney, with whom concurred Justice
Clarke, states clearly and concisely the issue between majority and
minority as to the equal protection of the laws; while Justice Brandeis
presents a veritable treatise upon the rules of law applicable to disputes
between employer and employee in England, in the British Dominions,
and in this country.
The Arizona Statute in effect prohibited the issuance of an injunction
in a labor dispute "unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to
property or to a property right" for which injury there was no adequate
remedy at law; and it further provided that any injunction issued
should not prohibit various acts, including "recommending, advising or
persuading others by peaceful means" to cease from working or from
patronizing or employing any party to a labor dispute. The plaintiffs
brought an action for injunctive relief alleging that the defendants
were insolvent and unable to respond in damages and that the plaintiffs
had no other speedy, adequate remedy, and setting forth certain acts
committed by the defendants during the course of a strike against the
plaintiffs concerning terms of employment in an endeavor to drive
patronage away from the plaintiffs' restaurant. After a trial on the
facts judgment was given for the defendants, and this judgment was
affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court.2 The plaintiffs then com-
menced another action against slightly different defendants, alleging
the same acts and again asking for an injunction. The complaint was
field v. Central Labor Council (1920, Or.) 192 Pac. 783. See also Okla. Rev.
Laws, 191o, sec. 3764, upheld in State v. Coyle (1912) 7 Okla. Cr. 50, 122 Pac.
243; Ex parte Schweitzer (1917) 13 Okla. Cr. 154, 162 Pac. 1134. 'In the
comments on Present Day Labor Litigation (COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 280, 404, 501, 618, 736; 31 ibid. 86) it was pointed out that while the
majority rule is that "peaceful picketing" is not unlawful, a minority hold
otherwise, and that statutes legalizing peaceful picketing are open to difficulties of
definition. 30 ibid. 405, 738. Chief Justice Taft in the American Steel Foundries
Case and in the principal case states that peaceful picketing is a contradiction in
terms which both the Clayton Act and the Arizona Statutes sedulously avoid, but
in the former case he held that peaceful persuasion by a single union representa-
tive stationed at each entrance to the employer's plant was permissible. But in
the principal case Justice Brandeis states that the Court in the former case held
peaceful picketing not unlawful. The difference is at least largely one of defini-
tion.
'Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 38o (1918) 19 Ariz. 379, 171 Pac. 121.
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demurred to, the Court sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment
for the defendants. This judgment was sustained by the Arizona
Supreme Court.3 It is this judgment which the Federal Supreme Court
now reverses.
The acts complained of by the plaintiffs consisted in part of patrolling
in front of the plaintiffs' restaurant with banners and loud appeals,
making libellous charges concerning one of the plaintiffs and applying
abusive epithets to him, disparaging the service rendered in the res-
taurant and the character of its patrons, and making threats of injury
against would-be patrons. The allegations of the complaint set forth
a very drastic form of campaign upon the part of the defendants which
could hardly be termed "peaceful." But the Arizona Court held that
it was not shown not to have been peaceful, apparently because there
was an absence of direct physical force and violence.
The opinion of Chief Justice Taft is divided into two parts; a dis-
cussion of the guaranty of due process of law, and a discussion of the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws, each given by the Four-
teenth Amendment.4 As to the first guaranty, the discussion proceeds
on familiar lines that the business of the plaintiffs is a property right,
and that to hold they are "remediless" where their business has been
thus largely destroyed is to deny them due process. With the statements
made in this part of the opinion it seems there may be rather general
agreement.5 One perhaps might suggest that the Court, in view of
decisions such as those sustaining the Arizona Employers' Liability Act
and the New York Rent Law,' should attempt to state how far under
the police power the relation of employer and employee may be sub-
jected to peculiar regulation by a state legislature.7  The question of
the constitutionality of the Kansas Industrial Court may call forth such
a discussion." In any event it seems probable that as yet at least the
state legislatures cannot render remediless such injuries as those the
plaintiffs are alleged to have received.
But it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the decision of this case
cannot and is not made to depend upon this part of the Court's opinion.
For the Statute deals only with the matter of injunctions9 and the
3 Triax v. Corrigan (1918) 20 Ariz. 7, 176 Pac. 570.
' The words of the Amendment are given in COMMENTS, infra, at p. 422.
5 An interesting subordinate question is how far the federal court is bound by
the lower court's finding of facts or interpretation of facts. The Supreme Court
seems correct, on principle and on the authority cited, that no constitutional ques-
tion should depend upon the shadowy distinction between questions of law and
questions of fact See Isaacs, The Law and the Facts (1922) 22 COL. L. R.v. i.
'Arizona Enployers' Liability Cases (1919) 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct 553;
Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (1921) 41 Sup. Ct 465; Block v. Hirsh
(1921) 41 Sup. Ct 458.
'See a suggestive note in (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 78.'
'See COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 75.
' See supra note i. The Statute discussed in Ex parte Schweitzer, supra note i,
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Arizona Court, whatever it may have said, had before it only a cause of
action for injunctive relief.10 Chief justice Taft applies the due
process clause only to the making "remediless" the injury to the plain-
tiffs, and says that if the opinion of the Arizona Court "does not with-
hold from the plaintiffs all remedy for the wrongs they suffered, but
only the equitable relief of injunction, there still remains the question
whether they are thus denied the equal protection of the laws." Again,
he says that "it is beside the point to say that plaintiffs had no vested
right in equity relief, and that taking it away does not deprive them of
due process of law," for "this does not meet the objection under the
equality clause." The decision, therefore, turns entirely upon this
latter guaranty, and any reference to the due process clause can only be
dictum. The Court does not attempt to put its decision upon the very
questionable ground that anyone has a vested interest in a particular
kind of remedy.""
The effect of this equality guaranty may be considered from two
angles: first, does the guaranty require that the plaintiff should here
be accorded a primary right to some relief ; and second, if that question
is answered in the affirmative, must that relief be that of injunction?
As to the first, the Chief Justice states that the guaranty was intended
to secure equality of protection not only for all but against all similarl3x
situated; and he emphasizes the unequal privileges given the defend-
ants, "the distinction here between the ex-employees and other tort-
feasors," the "classification based on the relation of an employer, not
to an employee, but to one who has ceased to be so, in respect of torts
thereafter committed by such ex-employee," the fact that if competing
restaurant keepers "had inaugurated such a campaign," "an injunction
would necessarily have issued," and generally- the lack of equality
between the defendants and other wrongdoers.12 Justice Pitney here
takes issue squarely, stating that undue favoritism to the defendants is
not discrimination against the plaintiffs, of which discrimination alone
is more drastic than the Clayton Act which as shown above is more drastic than the
Arizona Act since the latter applies only to the form of remedy, while the others
attempt also to define the primary rights of the parties.
"WVhile certain statements of the Arizona Court are broad, it would seem that
when it is said that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, the words "for injunc-
tive relief" should be supplied. This is borne out by the statement in the first
case that a person attacked by a wrongful speech or writing, "if injured," may
recover damages, which is a complete remedy, and equity may not be invoked
because of the financial irresponsibility of the plaintiffs and the great number of
suits made necessary. See ig Ariz. at p. 394, 171 Pac. at p.: i7.
See Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Cole (1919) 251 U. S. 54, 40 Sup. Ct. 68
(citing cases).
"It seems scarcely correct to classify employees striking as to terms and condi-
tions of employment as "ex-employees" especially in view of the holding in the
Anterican Steel Found ries Case that a labor union as a whole was entitled to be
considered an interested party in a strike.
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they can complain, that it is as to the plaintiffs no more than a failure to
include in the general law a case which for the sake of consistency
ought to have been covered, and that to disregard this rule is to trans-
form the equality guaranty into an "insistence upon laws complete,
perfect, symmetrical."
Upon this point it is submitted with all deference that Justice Pitney
is clearly right and that he is borne out by both the history of the
Amendment and the history of its enforcement. It was passed after
the Civil War in order to place all people on an equality of rights, to
prevent a state from discrininating against anyone, but not to require
absolute uniformity of law.'8  And it has been construed, in the cases
cited by the Chief Justice as well as in others, to permit attacks on state
laws only by those who are discriminated against.14  If A has a right
against X, B must have a similar right against X, unless differen-
tiated by a proper and reasonable classification. But if B has a right
against X, he cannot thereby claim that he must have a similar right
against Y or object because Y may be privileged where X is not. Such'
a complaint can only be made by X. So here if the defendants are
unfairly privileged as against competing employers, it is for the latter
alone to complain. 5
13 "It (the Amendment) was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoy-
ment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and
to give to that race the protection of the general government, in that enjoyment,
whenever it should be denied by the states." Strauder v. West Virginia (i88o)
IOO U. S. 303. Mr. justice Miller's doubt in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873,
U. S.) 16 Wall.. 36, whether any state action not a discrimination against the
negroes would ever be held to come within the purview of the equality provision
has, of course, not been substantiated. For a case where the equality clause
should properly apply see Comm NTs, infra, at p. 422.
4 The usual rule that only one injured by a statute can question its constitu-
tionality (12 C. J. 76o) applies here, so that only one discriminated against by a
statute may question it as denying the equal protection of the laws. Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases (IgIg) 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct 553; Jeffrey Mfg.
Co. v. Blagg (1915) 235 U. S. 571, 35 Sup. Ct 167; Hendrick v. Maryland (1915)
235 U. S. 61o, 35 Sup. Ct 140; Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright (1912) 225
U. S. 540, 32 Sup. Ct. 784; State v. Case (1918) 132 Md. 269, 103 At. 569. See
many cases collected, 12 C. J. 768, 769; 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 954, note. In the case
much relied on by the Court, where an anti-trust act was held invalid because of
provisions excepting agricultural products and live stock in the hands of the
producer or raiser, the question was raised by one upon whom the unequal duty
was placed. Connolly v. The Union Sewer Pipe Company (19o2) 184 U. S. 540,
22 Sup. Ct 431. The oft-quoted statement in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) I18
U. S. 356, 359, 6 Sup. Ct 1O64, that "the equal protection of the laws is a pledge
of equal laws" seems to mean little, but it does put an unfortunate emphasis upon
equality in the law itself rather than equality in the protection granted.
5 Thus in the case cited of Bogni v. Perotti (1916) 224 Mass. 152, 112 N. E.
853, which perhaps is the nearest in support of the principal case and is by
a court most drastic in its attitude towards labor, it is carefully pointed out that
a denial of injunctive relief is a discrimination against another laborer who does
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If the equality clause is thus construed, the effect is to shift the
emphasis from the situation of the defendants to that of the plaintiffs.
It is not important then that these "tort-feasors" may be unwisely
privileged; the question is whether plaintiffs are denied rights which
others similarly situated have. And as plaintiffs have such right as all
other employers have, the question is therefore entirely one of the rea-
sonableness of the classification which puts employers into a separate
group from other plaintiffs. No cumulative weight against the Statute
may be piled up because the plaintiffs' competitors are harmed or the
defendants are privileged; the case is purely whether the classifiation
made is so unreasonable as to deny plaintiffs rights which those similarly
situated enjoy.
As to the reasonableness of the classification a glance at arty annota-
tions of the digested cases construing the equality clause is highly sug-
gestive. Here appear cases almost without number sustaining a vast
variety of classifications-employers and employees under workmen's
compensation and employers' liability acts, employers and employees in
particular occupations and businesses (such as those in railroad res-
taurants distinguished from those in all other restaurants,38 ) retailers
who are making bulk sales, those who would use the national flag in
advertising, junk-dealers, doctors or undertakers distinguished from
other humans, and so on in almost endless combinations' 7-- while inter-
spersed are only a comparatively few where the classifications attempted
have been held unreasonable.' 8 With this as a background should be
considered "the state of the art"'" as shown in Justice Brandeis' com-
not come within the terms of the statute and that as to such laborer, the validity
of the statute may be attacked. The plaintiffs there were such other laborers.
" Dominion Hotel v. Arizona (igi8) 249 U. S. 265, 39 Sup. Ct 273.
"IN. Y. Central Ry. v. White (1917) 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct 247; Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases (1919) 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553; Lamieux v.
Young (9o9) 211 U. S. 489, 29 Sup. Ct 174; Halter v. Nebraska (1907) 205
U. S. 34, 27 Sup. Ct 419; Rosenthal v. New York (1912) 226 U. S. 260, 33 Sup.
Ct 27; Collins v. Texas (1912) 223 U. S. 288, 32 Sup. Ct 286; Keller v. State
(1914) 122 Md. 677, 90 Atl. 603. See ii U. S. Comp. Sts. Ann. E916, 14817 et
seq.; 2 ibid. Supplement, 1919, 2655 et seq.
The effect of some of these at least has been weakened by later decisions. Cf.
Connelly v. Union Sewer Pipe Line Company, supra note 14, with Carroll v.
Greenwich Ins. Co. (igo5) 199 U. S. 401, 26 Sup. Ct 66, and Otis v. Parker
(19o3) 187 U. S. 6o6, 23 Sup. Ct 168; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis (1897) 165
U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct 255 (attorneys' fees on small claims against a railroad)
with Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Matthews (1899) 174 U. S. 96, 19 Sup. Ct 6o,
and Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers (1907) 207 U. S. 73, 28 Sup. Ct 28; and
Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (igoi) 183 U. S. 79, 22 Sup. Ct 30, with
St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois (1902) 185 U. S. 203, 22 Sup. Ct. 616, and
McLean v. Kansas (1909) 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206.
'Cf. Muller v. Oregon (19o8) 2o8 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct 324, saying that in
patent cases counsel usually open by discussing the state of the art, and referring
to Mr. Brandeis' brief then before the Court which collected authorities showing
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prehensive survey of the views of courts and legislatures on this prob-
lem, demonstrating a widely-held belief that the relation of employers to
their employees deserves and requires special treatment.20 Finally should
be considered the well-settled rule that the act must be sustained unless
the classification is clearly unreasonable. 2 1  It is hard to follow the
Court to its conclusion that this classification is clearly unreasonable.
The decision is regrettable.
As to the necessity of granting the remedy of injunction, Justice
Brandeis again collects authority to show the discretionary character of
this particular form of remedy. He shows that it is refused where there
is an adequate remedy at law, and also in cases of contracts for personal
service, of actionable libels, of mere political rights, where the opera-
tions of the police department are involved, in cases of nuisance where
the doctrine of balance of convenience or comparative equities obtains,
where a remedy is expressly given for a statutory right, and where Con-
gress has prohibited the use of injunctions as in the matters of pro-
ceedings in state courts, and the illegal assessment and collection of
taxes.
Many people, including some good lawyers, have felt that the injunc-
tion was not a proper remedy for a labor dispute. It has not been long
used in this country in such disputes and in England it is infrequently
employed, resort being had to the criminal law or to actions for dam-
ages.2 2  However much we may be convinced of its value, it does not
seem a necessity to the adjustment of labor difficulties. One may
regret, therefore, that an experiment along the lines advocated by so
many persons which was to be tried in a limited way in Arizona and
the course of legislation upon hours of labor for women, the question then .at
issue.
'o Chief Justice Taft suggests that it is a far cry from the classification of
employer and employee under workmen's compensation acts to the classification in
the principal case. But before the former acts became so familiar to us, which
would have seemed the greater step, to impose upon a class "liability without
fault" or to deny certain persons in certain cases the equitable remedy of injunc-
tion? Cf. Justice McKenna and Justice McReynolds dissenting in Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases, supra note 14. COMMENTS (1919) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 225. Again the Chief Justice says as to classification: "When funda-
mental rights are thus attempted to be taken away, however, we may well subject
such experiment to attentive judgment." But this "attentive judgment" should be
only to determine the existence of a reasonable distinction between those included
and those excluded from the operation of the Statute, not to pass on legislative
policies. Earlier the Chief Justice seems, impliedly at least, to have admitted
that an injunction is not a fundamental right.
Dominion Hotel v. Arizona (1919) 249 U. S. 265, 268, 39 Sup. Ct. 273, 274.
' See authorities collected by Justice Brandeis, who points out that the injunc-
tion did not secure recognition as a remedy in labor disputes in this country until
1888. See also Gregory, Governmett by Injunction (1898) II HARV. L. REv. 487,
and statement by Mr. Frank Morrison in 1921 quoted in COMENTS (1921) 3
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 86.
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other states has thus been prevented, just as one would regret if the
Kansas experiment of the industrial court should be prematurely
snuffed out.
23
A final question is as to the effect of the decision. The case is
remanded for the issuance of an injunction if the facts alleged are
proved.2' It appears that the real difference between the State and the
Federal 'Courts is as to the interpretation of the facts-the application
of the Statute to the facts. Had the Arizona Court held the defendants'
acts to have been not peaceful, the Statute would not have applied.
The Supreme Court distinguishes its support of the Clayton Act in the
Anerican Steel Foundries Case from this case on the ground not only
that there is no requirement of equality as to Congressional action, but
also because of the construction of this Statute made by the State Court.
By this construction the Federal Court is bound. 25 But in view of the
usual rule as to the effect of judgments, a decision of the unconstitu-
tionality of an act is only binding in the very case made and anyone
may raise the question again in another case.2 6 There is thus legally
no distinction between a decision as to a statute which appears fair on
its face but is unconstitutionally applied, and one not fair on its face.
In either case the decision only affects the situation then before the
See supra note 8.
24 The Court's conclusion is that "if the evidence sustains the averments of the
complaint, an injunction should issue as prayed." But the injunction prayed for
was, according to the lower court, one "prohibiting the defendant from attending
at or near the plaintiffs' place of business for the purpose of peaceably communi-
cating the existence of a strike pending, and of peaceably persuading any person
from patronizing the plaintiffs, or from recommending, advising, or persuading
others so to do." 2o Ariz. at p. 9, 176 Pac. at p. 571. The Court had decided, in
spite of Justice Holmes' view to the contrary, that the invalidity of this Statute
did not render invalid the entire Statute giving the Arizona courts power to issue
injunctions. This point is not discussed herein. See Davis, Director General of
Railroads v. Wallace (Jan. 19, 1922) U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. Term, 1921, No. 329.
' Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 61, 73, 31 Sup. Ct 337,
338; Hill v. Dockery (i9o3) 191 U. S. 165, 24 Sup. Ct 53. But there are state-
ments that the Supreme Court is not bound by the lower court's statement of the
meaning of the Statute. Yick Wo v. Hopkins supra, note 14; Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry. v. Mathews (1899) 174 U. S. 96, ioo, ig Sup. Ct 6og, 611; Hodge
v. Muscatine County (1905) 196 U. S. 276, 25 Sup. Ct 237. Again a law fair on
"its face may be so improperly applied as to violate the Constitution. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, supra, note 14; Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (1894) 154 U. S.
362, 390, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047, 1051. Cf. Pound, J., dissenting in People v. Doyle
(1921) 232 N. Y. 96, commented on in CURRENT D czsIoxs, infra at p. 45o. Any
apparent inconsistency here should, it seems, be reconciled by recognizing the rule
stated in the text that the decision of unconstitutionality binds only the parties to
the case and their privies, and hence applies only to the application of the Statute
made to the particular facts in issue.
'Middleton v. Texas, P. & L. Co. (1919) 249 U. S. 152, 39 Sup. Ct. 227;
Shephard v. Wheeling (1887) 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S. E. 635; Rutten v. Paterson
(19o6) 73 N. J. L. 467, 64 At. 573; In re Wine (192o, Fla.) 83 So. 627.
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court. Practically, however, in the latter case, the matter will not again
be litigated, and the Statute may be treated as void.2 7 Hence we may
properly emphasize, as does the Supreme Court, that it is here definitely
the application of the Statute made by the State Court which is found
objectionable. There is no reason why the State Court may not on
another set of facts make its views conform to those now promulgated
as the law of the land.2 8  C.E.C.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS
Foreign exchange transactions have become of novel importance
during the last six years and a great amount of litigation has pro-
duced confused decisions. The war, the fluctuating rates of exchange,
and the apparent position of the United States as the world's bankers
have contributed to a situation that demands legal clarity and certainty.
A large part of the business of foreign exchange consists of selling
credits available at a foreign point to those who desire to make pay-
ments at that point. The purchaser of foreign exchange seldom buys
currency; he buys credit, a chose in action, made available abroad by
an agent or correspondent of the seller. The draft which may be
delivered to the purchaser is only a piece of paper evidencing the trans-
action; the message which may be sent to the seller's correspondent
by mail or by cable is merely part of the mechanics of making the
credit available.' The actual money paid by the purchaser is not
transmitted to the foreign point. It becomes the seller's property and
he does not hold it as trustee or agent until the payment of the credit
is effected.2
The transactions are of various forms, each governed to a large
extent by the terms of a special contract. In the case of a draft pay-
able in a foreign country, the seller draws an order on his correspond-
ent, warranting that it will be accepted and paid when presented at the
foreign point. The buyer is usually given the draft and undertakes
the duty and risk of forwarding it abroad by mail. The cable transfer
is a much faster method. The seller agrees to establish forthwith by
means of a cable message a credit in favor of a payee abroad designated
by the purchaser. The seller generally specifies in the contract that
he will not be responsible for errors or delays in the transmission of the
message unless caused by him. The seller of a cable transfer ordinarily
undertakes to notify the payee abroad, designated by the purchaser,"
that the credit has been established and may undertake to hand over
'Norton v. Shelby County (1886) 1iO U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct 112.
' Middleton v. Texas, P. & L. Co., supra note 26.
It seems clearly erroneous to consider the draft as the thing bought. But see
(1921) 35 HARv. L. RFv. 88.
'Legniti v. Mechanics & Metals National Bank (1921) 230 N. Y. 415, 130 N. E.
597.
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foreign currency to the payee. The foreign money order is still another
method whereby credits are made available abroad, and is the method
utilized by steamship and express companies for the transmission of
small sums of money to foreign points. The purchaser pays to the
steamship or express company,. which sells the money order, a sum in
United States currency which represents the equivalent at the existing
rate of exchange of a certain amount of foreign money, plus, perhaps,
a small charge for the service to be rendered. The seller informs
its correspondent abroad of the sale of each foreign money order by
mail, and the correspondent in turn usually purchases a foreign postal
money order for the agreed amount of foreign money and mails it to
the designated payee.
Is the transaction when entered into a sale of a credit, a contract to
sell a credit, or a simple executory contract of service to establish a
credit? The mere act of drawing a draft does not operate as an
assignment of a credit, and therefore can not of itself be a sale of a
credit. Is the transaction a contract to sell? Suppose the seller has
not a credit at the foreign point at the time he contracts to sell one.
He may merely have the means of obtaining it.3 It is submitted, there-
fore, that the transaction may be a simple executory contract to create
a credit, which is not within the Statute of Frauds.' In a recent case, 5
' "These are banker's drafts or checks and are accepted as the equivalent of so
much cash because confidence is reposed in the standing of the banker issuing the
drafts and his credit if not his cash balance with his correspondent bank on which
the draft is drawn." Hough, Practical Exporting (1920) 473. Mr. Franklin
Escher, speaking of commercial credit transactions, says: "As in the case of
foreign loans previously described, the banker's credit and the banker's credit
alone is the basis of the whole operation. The London bank never pays out any
actual cash-it merely 'accepts' a four months' sight draft, knowing that before
the draft comes due and is presented at its wicket for payment, 'cover' will have
been provided from New York." Elements of Foreign Exchange (igio) 155.
See also NoTEs (igig) 19 CoL. L. REv. 322.
'If the credit is not in existence at the time the transaction is entered into, this
is an assignment of a chose in action which is to be acquired in the future. Such
assignments are not enforceable unless the chose in action has potential existence,
that is, unless there is some contract agreement under which the chose in action
will in all probability come into existence in the future. O'Niel v. Kerr Co.
(1905) 124 Wis. 234, 1O2 N. W. 573; see dissenting opinion in Equitable Trust
Co. v. Keene (1921) 195 App. Div. 384, 186 N. Y. Supp. 468. Although the
parties generally speak of the transaction as a "sale," as a matter of fact, until
the credit has been established, all that the buyer acquires is an obligation of the
seller to secure credit at the foreign point. See Stone, Some Legal Problems
Involved in the Trannnission of Funds (1921) 21 CoL. L. REv. 507, 513.
'Equitable Trust Co. v. Keene, supra note 4. The case is now on appeal. The
Court was influenced by the statement in Strohmeyer & Arpe Co. v. Guiaranty
Trust Co. (1916) 172 App. Div. 16, 157 N. Y. Supp. 955, that "the seller engages
that he has a balance at the point on which payment was ordered." It is submitted
that this was merely the stipulation of the parties in that case. The seller was
shown actually to have had a credit at the time the transaction was entered into.
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however, the court assumed that the credit was in existence at the time
the transaction was entered into and held that an agreement to sell
a cable transfer of exchange was an agreement to sell an existing chose
in action and had to be in writing. Under the *facts in the case it may
very well have been a simple executory contract for future service.
In discussing the measure of damages when payment of the credit
has not been effected, an analysis of the cases seems advisable. Many
of the decisions seem to be in conflict, but it is believed that they may
be distinguished. If the seller negligently or wilfully fails to create the
credit, or if his correspondent refuses to honor the draft or to act upon
a cable transfer, it is clear that the buyer can recover the dollars paid.0
If, however, the seller and his correspondent are not negligent, but the
establishment of the credit has been prevented by some unforeseen
circumstance and the seller is unable to communicate with his cor-
respondent or the correspondent is unable to locate the payee, the situa-
tion is more difficult. It seems unfair to compel a seller who has acted
with reasonable care and attempted to effect payment of the credit
through his correspondent to bear a loss due to the depreciated value of
the credit. On the other hand it is equally unfair to let the seller profit
from the transaction if he still has the purchaser's money and has not
acquired a credit for him. Unless, therefore, the seller has appro-
priated a credit to the contract-that is, either procured aforeign credit
for the purchaser in reliance on the contract, or else notified the cor-
respondent to transfer part of an existing credit to cover the contract
in question-the purchaser should be permitted to rescind the contract
and recover all moneys paid.7 The seller is not responsible for a mere
reasonable delay in the establishment of the credit, however.8  Gen-
erally the credit has been appropriated to the contract, but payment has
been prevented or rendered impossible through no fault of the seller.
The purchaser can then recover only the value of the credit at the time
The statement has been quoted in several other cases and is the. cause of much
confusion.
'Gross v. Mendel (1916) 171 App. Div. 237, 157 N. Y. Supp. 357, affirmed
without opinion (IgI8) 225 N. Y. 633, 121 N. E. 871; Beecher v. Cosmopolitan
Trust Co. (1921, Mass.) 131 N. E. 338. Another case allows the drawee of a
dishonored draft to recover only at the current rate of exchange on the date of
demand, but there was a statute which specifically so provided. American Express
Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co. (1921, Mass.) 132 N. E. 26, applying Mass. Rev.
Laws, 19o2, ch. 73, sec. 9. For a discussion of the question of damages in foreign
currency, see COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 198.
"Atlantic Communication Co. v. Zimmerman (1918) 182 App. Div. 862, 17o
N. Y. Supp. 275; Pfotenkauer v. Equitable Trust Co. (1921, Sup. C) 115 Misc.
396, 188 N. Y. Supp. 464.
'Strohmeyer & Arpe Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra note 5. How long a
delay is reasonable has not been'determined but it is conceivable that the purchaser
would be justified in refusing to accept a credit which was established long after
the time contemplated by the contract.
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of demand," unless payment had been expressly guaranteed. 10 The
seller must notify the purchaser within a reasonable time however, of
his inability to effect the payment. The burden of explaining the
failure to establish the credit is on the seller, though the court will take
judicial notice of war conditions."
'THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CONSTITUTIONAL
The decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in State, ex rel. Hop-
kins, Attorney-General v. Grove (1921, Kan.) 2O Pac. 82, holding con-
stitutional the Statute authorizing the courts of that State to render
declaratory judgments, will give satisfaction to the several critics of the
decision of the Michigan Supreme Court which held a similar statute
in that State unconstitutional.' A Statute of Kansas provided that no
employee of a railway company holding a franchise granted by or a
contract with a city shall, under penalty, hold any city office.. Grove,
a boilermaker employed by the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, was
elected a member of the Board of Commissioners of the City of
Wichita, Kansas. He as well as the Attorney-General were apparently
in doubt as to his capacity to hold office, not being certain whether the
Railroad had a franchise from or contract with the City. Had there
been no provision for a declaratory judgment in Kansas, practically the
only way for the elected officer to have tested his legal capacity to hold
'Fliker v. State Bank (1916, Mun. Ct) 94 Misc. 6og, I59 N. Y. Supp. 730;
Katcher v. American Express Co. (1920) 94 N. J. L. 165, lO9 Atl. 741; Sommer
v. Taylor (1921, Mun. Ct) i9o N. Y. Supp. 153; see Fraenkel, Some Aspects of
the Law Relating to Foreign Exchange (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 832. In Oshinsky
v. Taylor (igi8, Sup. Ct) 172 N. Y. Supp. 231, it does not appear from the facts
whether the credit had been appropriated to the contract but the purchaser was
allowed to recover only the value of the credit at the time of demand. In Safian
v. Irving Nat. Bank (1921, Sup. Ct) 116 Misc. 647, the seller appropriated foreign
money to the contract, but payment to the payee designated by the purchaser was
not effected because of a mistake in the address made by the cable company. In
spite of the fact that the seller had contracted specifically not to be liable "for any
loss or damage in consequence of any delay or mistake in transmitting the message
or for any cause beyond our control," the Court held that the purchaser could
rescind the contract and recover the money he had paid. The dissenting opinion
points out the inconsistency of this.
10 Wasserman v. Irving National Bank (1920, Mun. Ct.) 114 Misc. 704, 187
N. Y. Supp. 243.
' Oshinsky v. Taylor, supra note 9; Katcher v. American Express Co., supra
note 9.
'Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. (1920) 211 Mich. 592, 179 N. W. 350. Criticized
in NOTES (1920) 19 MIcE. L. REv. 86; COMMENTS (1920) 30 YALE LAW
JouRNAL, 161; NOTES (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 168; Schoonmaker, Declaratory
Judgment (1920) 5 MiNN. L. REv. 172; Dodd, Michigan Declaratory Judgment
Decision (1920) 6 A. B. A. JouR. 145; O'Donnel, Michigan Declaratory Judg-
inent Decision (1921) 7 A. B. A. JouR. 141; Rice, The Constitutionality of the
Declaratory Judgment (1921) 28 W. VA. L. QuART. i.
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the office would have been to enter upon the office and incur the penalty,
should 4is view of the validity of his title have proved erroneous. Being
apparently undesirous of courting this danger, he refrained from assum-
ing office, a decision which was perhaps unjust to the community and
himself. The possibility of obtaining a declaratory judgment resolved
what might have been an awkward situation. The Attorney-General,
who contested the defendant's title to office, brought an action for a
declaration that the defendant was under a disability to hold the office
to which he had been elected, and the defendant pleaded the unconstitu-
tionality of the Statute authorizing declaratory judgments as well as a
denial of his ineligibility.
The Kansas Court in holding the Statute constitutional first pointed
out the difference between the Michigan and the Kansas Act, in that
the latter was limited in its application to "cases of actual controversy."
While the Michigan decision relied in part upon the fact that the case
before it was not an actual controversy, it based its decision upon
grounds which, if sound, the Kansas Court admitted would be fatal to
the constitutionality of the Kansas Act. These grounds were that the
function of rendering declaratory judgments was not judicial, because
such a judgment was not final, but advisory, or moot, and that a valid
judgment of a court required "execution." The Kansas Court, after
examining these grounds comes unanimously to the conclusion that the
view of the Michigan court "appears to us to be unsound, and to be the
result of confusing declaratory judgments with advisory opinions and
decisions in moot cases." The Court adds:
"It is hardly conceivable that any fundamental principle of our gov-
ernment, beyond legislative control, prevents two disputants, each of
whom sincerely believes in the rightfulness of his own claim, but each
of whom wishes to abide by the law, whatever it may be determined
to be, from obtaining an adjudication of their controversy in the courts
without one or the other first doing something that is illegal (in the
case of the present defendant criminal) if he is mistaken in his view
of the law."
Thus the minority in the Michigan case and the critics who sustained
them are vindicated, and the obstruction 'to this useful reform, tem-
porarily interposed by the Michigan decision, now judicially adjudged
unsound, is probably removed.
The case raises a further question which deserves consideration.
Ever since the Michigan decision was handed down, the draftsmen of
similar bills in other states have sought to avoid its blighting effect by
limiting the operation of the statute to "cases of actual controversy.'
Whether this limitation is essential is questionable. While most cases
will necessarily involve controverted issues, the declaratory judgment
has served a useful purpose in England and other countries by remov-
ing uncertainty from legal relations where only a potential controversy
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was apparent to the court. Thus, the removal of clouds from title does
not require an actual present controversy or contested issue nor does the
construction of a will2 or the directions sought by a trustee.' Nor does
the decision in Muskrat v. United States4 justify the belief that an
actual present controversy is essential to the declaratory judgment. In
that case, Congress adopted the unusual measure of authorizing certain
named individuals, including Muskrat, to prosecute an appeal from
the Court of Claims to the Supreme Court to test the constitutionality
of an Act of Congress. It did not appear that Muskrat had any interest
whatever in the case, a fact which sufficed to enable the Court to decline
to exercise jurisdiction. In addition, it did not appear that there was
any actual or potential controversy, nor did the judgment have any
known parties upon which it could operate. Such circumstances do not
warrant the conclusion that a party whose legal relations are in serious
doubt which requires removal and gives rise to a potential controversy
or litigation may not appeal to a court for a declaratory judgment,
citing all parties who might be opposed or whom the court considers it
desirable to cite, and obtain a final adjudication of his legal relations, as
binding as any other judgment. If insufficient or improper parties are
cited, the court will simply decline to make the declaration, and of
course, the judgment will not be binding upon interested parties who
were not cited or did not appear. If, in the instant case, Grove had
merely announced his doubt as to his capacity to hold office instead of
asserting his privilege, it is not apparent why a declaratory judgment
could not have been rendered, as a matter of constitutional law. It does
not seem necessary to the constitutionality of a declaratory judgment,
any more than it is necessary to other judgments in equity, that there
must be, as the Kansas Act provides, an "actual antagonistic assertion
and denial of right."
The declaratory judgment procedure is now in force in extended
form in New York, Connecticut, California, Wisconsin, Kansas, and
Florida.5 Bills for its adoption are pending in Congress (for the
'In re Drake [1921] 2 Ch. 99.
'In re Badische Co. Ltd. [1921] 2 Ch. 331.
' (1911) 219 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 250. It is on this case that the Michigan
court in the Anway case, supra note i, largely relied, and it seems to have alarmed
some of the proponents of declaratory judgment legislation. Mr. Rice, in his
article in the West Virginia Law Quarterly, supra note i, suggests that the Kansas
requirements for an "actual antagonistic assertion and denial of right" was
incorporated merely to make the statute "fool-proof"-in view of the Anway
case. It may serve to bar the rendering of the judgment where the defendant,
duly served, fails to appear and make answer. This would be an unfortunate limi-
tation of a court's customary jurisdiction.
'New York, Civil Practice Act, sec. 473, Laws, i92o, ch. 925, sec. 473; Con-
necticut, Pub. Acts, 1921, ch. 258; California, Act of May 27, 1921, now embodied
in Code of Civ. Proc. secs. io6o, io6i, io62; Wisconsin, Laws, igig, ch. 2, sec.
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federal courts) and in several state legislatures. Very probably it will
be revived in Michigan. The draft of a Uniform Act is before the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The next few years, there-
fore, are likely to witness a generous recourse to this method of deter-
mining legal relations and to afford us an opportunity to establish the
efficacy of this reform in the administration of justice. .
E. M. B.
HAS AN ALIEN THE PRIVILEGE OF FREE SPEECH?
In the recent case of State v.-Sinchuk (1921) 96 Conn. 605, 115 Atl.
33, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the guaranties of the
privileges of free speech and of assembly contained in the Bill of Rights
of the State Constitution have no application to aliens, but are privileges
conferred upon citizens alone. Under this interpretation of the State
Constitution the defendant, an alien, was not permitted to attack the
constitutionality of the State Sedition Act,' for, not being possessed of
any political privileges under the Constitution it would be impossible for
himi to show that the Statute in question had deprived him of the priv-
ilege of free speech.2 This decision may be open to objection for two
reasons: (I) the language of the sixth section of the Connecticut Bill
of Rights probably does not justify its restriction to citizens alone; and
(2) the decision perhaps deprives the defendant of the equal protection
of the laws in violation of the first section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution.3
3687 m, p. 253; Kansas, Laws, 1921, ch. i68; Florida, Laws, igig, ch. 7857, No.
75, P. 148.
The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, 1urnell, J., has just
held the California Statute unconstitutional, relying principally on the unsound
decision of the Michigan court in the Anway case. The Court was not apparently
aware of the Kansas decision. The case is, it is understood, now on appeal to the
California Supreme Court. Newberry v. Newberry, reported in the San Francisco
Recorder, Dec. 30, 1921.
IConn. Pub. Acts, 1919, ch. 312, entitled "An Act Concerning Sedition." The
act declares a punishment for speaking or publishing any disloyal, scurrilous, or
abusive matter concerning the form of government of the United States, its
military forces, flag or uniform, or any matter intended to ,bring them into
contempt, or which creates or fosters opposition to organized government The
still more drastic Act (Conn. Pub. Acts, 1919, ch. 191) against advocating in public
any doctrine intended to injuriously affect the state or federal government was not
involved. See COMMENTS (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 108. The constitution-
ality of these statutes as to citizens is yet to be determined.
' Before any law can be attacked by any person on the ground that it is uncon-
stitutional it must be shown that its enforcement has violated or will violate his
constitutional privileges. Hooker v. Burr (19o4) 194 U. S. 415, 24 Sup. Ct. 7o6;
Citizens' National Bank v. Kentucky (1910) 217 U. S. 443, 30 Sup. Ct 532.
3 , nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U. S. Const. Amendments, art. 14, sec. i.
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There is no doubt that sections two,4 five,5 and sixteen6 of the Con-
necticut Bill of Rights haveno application to aliens, but, as pointed out
by Chief "Justice Wheeler in his dissenting opinion, the wording of the
sixth section is sufficiently broad to afford aliens the privilege of free
speech This section provides that "no law shall ever be passed to
curtail the liberty 6f speech or of the press." It is a cardinal rule of
constitutional construction that unless the wording of a particular pro-
vision either specifically or by logical intendment restricts its guaranties
to a certain class, it will be construed as applying to everyone, whether
citizens or not.7  The majority, in the instant case, read sections five
and six together, and limited the broad language of section six by the
specific limitations of section five, which applied to citizens alone. This
seems a rather strained and unjustifiably narrow construction, quite
contrary to the rule of constitutional construction just mentioned. In
some cases the courts have held that an alien has no liberty of speech,
but these instances can easily be distinguished from the instant case.
In Goldman v. Reyburn, 8 where this result was reached, the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution specifically limited the guaranty of free speech to
citizens, and in United States v. Williams,9 a case often cited as hold-
ing that an alien does not possess this privilege, the Court merely
decided that the exclusion of alien anarchists from the United States by
act of Congress 0 does not constitute a violation of the privilege of free
speech, since Congress has the power to exclude aliens and to prescribe
the terms and conditions on which they enter. There is apparently no
authority to support the Connecticut Court in holding that an alien is
not protected by a constitutional guaranty so general in its scope as the
sixth section of the Connecticut Bill of Rights.
" Conn. Constitution, art. I, sec. 2. Referring to this section, Beach, J., in the
principal case said: "The right affirmed by this section ii the right of the people
to alter their form of government. It is because it is their own and instituted by
themselves for their own benefit that they have the right to alter it The proposi-
tion that aliens have an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter our form of
government will hardly bear statement"
"'Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." Conn. Constitution,
art. i, sec. 5. Aliens can not enjoy the guaranties of this section as they are
specifically restricted to citizens.
"'The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common
good, and apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of
grievances, or other purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance." Conn. Con-
stitution, art 1, sec. 16. The guaranties of this section like those of section five
are specifically restricted to citizens alone.
Truax v. Raich (1915) 239 U. S. 33. 36 Sup. Ct 7; Yick Wo v. Hopkins(1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct lO64; Ex Parte Case (1911) 20 Idaho, 128, Ii6
Pac. 1037.
'(igog) 36 Pa. Co. 58r. '(1904) 194 U. S. 279, 24 Sup. Ct 7ig.10The Alien Immigration Act Act of March 3, 1903 (32 Stat at L. 2r3).
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It is also rather difficult to disagree with the dissenting Chief Justice
in his contention that the construction placed upon the Connecticut
Constitution by the majority denies the defendant the equal lrotection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That this is
due to aliens as well as citizens seems to be universally recognized. 1
It is not easy to understand how a state, having no power to exclude
aliens12 or to impose burdensome regulations upon their entry,13 can
arbitrarily discriminate 4 against them after they have come within its
jurisdiction. That the Connecticut Supreme Court did discriminate
between alien and citizen in denying the defendant the privilege of free
speech cannot be denied, and in so doing it appears that it may have
transgressed one of the limitations placed upon the power of the State
by the Fourteenth Amendment.1 5
It should be noted that in the instant case the particular language
alleged to have been used by the aliens in violation of the Statute was
not before the Court but only the general constitutional question.
1Truax v. Raich, supra note 7; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra note 7; Templar
v. State Examiners (19o2) 131 Mich. 254, go N. W. 1058; Ex Parte Kotta (1921,
Calif.) 2o0 Pac. 957; State v. Montgomery (19oo) 94 Me. 192, 47 Atl. 165. To
quote from the opinion in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra note 7; "These provisions
(referring to due process and and equal protection of the laws) are universal in
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard
to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Italics ours.)
State v. The Steamship "Constitution" (1872) 42 Calif. 578; Lin Sing v.
Washburn (1862) 2o Calif. 534.
'Passenger Cases (1849, U. S.) 7 How. 283; Ex Parte Ah Cue (1894) 1o1
Calif. 197, 35 Pac. 556.
"A state has the power to discriminate between citizens and aliens in the distri-
bution of its own resources. The common property of a state belongs to the
people of the state and citizens may be preferred in its distribution. McCready v.
Virginia (1876) 94 U. S. 391; People v. Crane (1915) 214 N. Y. 154, io8 N. E.
427; Atkin v. Kansas (19o3) 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124; Ex Parte Gilletti
(1915) 7o Fla. 442, 70 So. 446.
1" It is undoubtedly true that freedom of speech is one of the so-called "funda-
mental rights" safeguarded by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"It should be observed of the terms (as used in the Fourteenth Amendment) 'life,'
'liberty,' and 'property' that they are representative terms and are intended and
must be understood to cover every right to which a member of the body politic is
entitled under the law .... The rights thus guaranteed are something more than
the mere privileges of locomotion; the guarantee is the negation of arbitrary
power in every form which results in the deprivation of right .... It would
be absurd, for instance, to say that arbitrary arrests were forbidden, but that the
freedom of speech, the freedom of religious worship, the right of self defence
against unlawful violence, the right freely to buy and sell as others may, or the
right in public schools found no protection here." (Italics ours.) 2 Story, The
Constitution (5th ed. i8gi) sec. 195o. Also see, Marx and Haas Jeans Clothing
Company v. Watson (19o2) 168 Mo. 133, 67 S. W. 391; Gillespie v. People (19oo)
188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. ioo7.
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SERVICE BY PUBLICATION IN SUIT INVOLVING EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT
OF INSURANCE POLICY
A took out a life insurance policy in the defendant company with his
sister as beneficiary. Under the terms of the policy A was privileged
to change the beneficiary without the assent of the beneficiary herself.
Subsequently, in consideration of marriage, A agreed to substitute as
beneficiary the plaintiff, his future wife. The policy was delivered to
the plaintiff who thereafter paid the premiums. A died without having
the policy changed. The plaintiff sued in equity to have herself
declared the equitable owner of the policy and to have the proceeds paid
to her, in which suit the defendant company and the beneficiary, a resi-
dent of Austria, who was served by publication, were made parties
defendant.
The trial court dismissed the complaint,1 but the decision was reversed
by the Appellate Division.2 The appellate court relied upon a decision
of the Court of Appeals, Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.3 In
the latter case A took out a policy for $5,000, which was payable to his
wife and, in case she died before him, to their children. Being unable
to pay the premiums A and his wife assigned the policy by way of
security to B, who paid the premiums, $4,500 in all. In a suit by B's
administrator against the company and A's children, who had become
beneficiaries under the policy and who were non-residents of the state
and were served by publication, to impress a lien upon the policy for the
amount of the premiums advanced, it was held that the action was in
the nature of a proceeding in rein and that jurisdiction over the children
had been acquired.
When the instant case came before the Appellate Division a second
time the Court reversed itself by a vote of three to two, 4 the majority
of the judges feeling constrained to do so by the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the case of Hanna v. Stedman,5 which had been rendered
in the meanwhile. The proceeding in the Hanna Case was one of inter-
pleader and it was held that jurisdiction could not be acquired over the
non-resident claimant by publication.
It is submitted that the decision upon the first appeal in the Schoen-
holz Case was correct and that the Hanna Case is not opposed.
The principal case raises two questions of a fundamental character:
(I) What solution does sound policy demand? (2) Is it possible to
reach such solution under the existing law? As regards the first of
'Schoenholz v. New York Life Ims. Co. (igig, Sup. Ct) io6 Misc. 340, 175
N. Y. Supp. 684.
" (I92O) 192 App. Div. 563, 183 N. Y. Supp. 251.
" (19o7) 189 N. Y. 447, 82 N. E. 438.
'(1921, App. Div.) 188 N. Y. Supp. 596.
(1921) 230 N. Y. 326, I3O N. E. 566.
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these questions the answer leaves scarcely room for doubt. Unless the
insurance company is permitted to bring in the Austrian beneficiary, it
.will be subject to another suit at the hands of such party. Being free
from fault, sound policy would seem to require that the rights of the
parties should be litigated in a single proceeding. The mere fact that
one of the parties interested is a non-resident should not defeat this
policy, if the just rights of such party can be properly safe-guarded.
Is it possible to justify such a proceeding under the existing law?
Here there may be differences of opinion. We are confronted in the
first place with the fact that the common law has taken an extreme
attitude in making jurisdiction depend upon personal service.6 In
England this requirement has been greatly relaxed in modem times, and
if the action had been brought there, the Austrian beneficiary could have
been made a party upon substituted service.7 The power of the various
states of this country to permit substituted service with reference to
non-residents is restricted, however, by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution. Pennoyer v. Neff" has laid down the funda-
mental rule that judgments in personamn cannot be rendered against a
non-resident upon constructive service without violating the due process
clause, the Supreme Court being of the opinion that any other rule
would lead to fraud and oppression. But where there is property in
the state and the proceeding is started by bringing such property under
the control of the court by seizure or some equivalent act, i. e., where
it is in rem or quasi in rem, substituted service is permissible.
8 In continental countries jurisdiction is never made to depend upon personal,
service. A personal suit may be brought always if the defendant has a domicil
in the country. France: Code of Civil Procedure, art. 59; Garsonnet & C~zar-
Bru, Traitj Tlorique et Pratique de Procidure Civile et Commerciale (3d ed.
1912) 845. Germany: Code of Civil Procedure, secs, 13, 16; I Gaupp-Stein, Die
Zivilprozessordnung fiir das Deutsche Reich (Ixth ed. 1913) 58. Italy: Code of
Civil Procedure, art. go.
In addition to such general forum special fori exist as regards special classes
of cases. For example, in Germany suit may be brought on contracts in the place
where the contract is to be performed. Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 29; I
Gaupp-Stein, op. cit. 88; I Petersen, Die Civilprozessordnung fiir das Deutsche
Reich (5th ed. 1904) 69. In Italy jurisdiction exists either in the place where the
contract was made or where it was to be performed. Code of Civil Procedure,
art. gi, par. i. As regards commercial matters, see also Code of Civil Procedure,
art. gi, par. 2.
Special restrictions exist sometimes as regards foreigners. 5 Weiss, Traiti
Thiorique et Pratique de Droit International Privi (2d ed. 1913) 314. The
jurisdiction is, on the other hand, extended at times inordinately in favor of citi-
zens, for example in France. French Civil Code, art. 14; 5 Weiss, op. cit. 6, 79.
Concerning the mode of citation where the defendant is without the state, see
French Code of Civil Procedure, art. 69, sec. IO, modified by law of May ii, igoo;
German Code of Civil Procedure, sec. igg; Italian Code of Civil Procedure, art.
142.
Dicey, Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 19o8) 243.
8 (1877) 95 U. S. 714.
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If it be asked: What is the distinction between an action in personam
and an action in rem or quasi in yem, it is difficult to find an answer
that is both accurate and comprehensive. The Supreme Court of the
United States has defined a suit in personam as one in which "the entire
object of the action is to determine personal rights and obligations of
the parties." 9 As a broad descriptive statement this definition may be
as good as any that can be framed, but it is manifestly too ambiguous
to be of much value in the consideration of a particular case. Instead
of attempting to operate with definitions, sound conclusions can
obviously be more readily reached if we start with the power of a state
with respect to all property found within its territory, which includes the
power to define and to determine the rights of parties in or concerning
such property, irrespective of the residence of such parties. That
such power exists with respect to real property and 'chattels is uni-
versally conceded. The dispute relates merely to choses in action.
A distinction might be made, of course, between tangible property
on the one hand and intangible property on the other. Only the
former has a physical situs; the latter can have a situs only in legal
contemplation. The contention has been made by an eminent authority
that a state has no power to authorize garnishment proceedings in the
absence of personal sei-vice upon the non-resident creditor or voluntary
submission on his part to the jurisdiction of the court.10 This position
is defensible from the standpoint of logic, but it does not meet the
practical needs. Because of such practical considerations the Supreme
Court of the United States has established the rule that for purposes of
garnishment a debt is to be regarded as a thing, a res, wherever the
garnishee is."-
If the state in which the garnishee is served has the power to extin-
guish the rights of the non-resident against such garnishee upon con-
structive service, it is not easy to see why the same power should not
exist in other than garnishment proceedings, whenever the legislation
in question seeks to provide a method for determining who of several
claimants is the owner of a chose in action.' 2 Granted the desirability
of the end, there would appear to be no reason why such an extension
should not be made. The ultimate test of what constitutes due process
of law is the reasonableness of the legislation and such reasonableness is
determined very largely with reference to the social needs in general.
So far as the rights of the absentee are concerned, they need not be
sacrificed in the least if the power of the state contended for be recog-
nized. The Supreme Court-has held in Harris v. Balk" that the gar-
Ibid. 727.
"0 Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Ren to Compel Payment of a Debt
(1913) 27 HARv. L. REv. 107, 12o.
"Harris v. Balk (,9o5) 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625.
11See COMMENTS (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 252.
"Supra note ii.
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nishee could avail himself of the judgment in the garnishment proceed-
ing in a subsequent suit by his creditor, who had been served merely by
publication, only if he had notified him of such proceedings, or if the
creditor had otherwise notice thereof in time to protect his rights. For
the protection of the non-resident served constructively the same con-
dition should be applied to the insurance company in the case under
consideration.
The final question to be determined is therefore whether the legisla-
tion of New Ydrk constituted a sufficient exercise of the power vested in
the state to justify constructive service upon the Austrian beneficiary.
The provision of the New York law relied upon in the cases is subdi-
vision 5 of section 438 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides
as follows:
"An order directing the service of a summons upon a defendant,
without the State, or by publication, may be made in either of the
following cases:
"5. Where the complaint demands judgment, that the defendant be
excluded from a vested or contingent interest in or lien upon, specific
real or personal property within the State; or that such an interest or
lien in favor of either party be enforced, regulated, defined or limited;
or otherwise affecting the title to such property."
The Court of Appeals having held in the Morgan Case 4 that the term
"specific .. .personal property" included choses in action, it would
seem that constructive service upon the Austriah beneficiary in the
Schoenholz Case constituted due process of law.' 5 Whether the plain-
tiff sues to "impress a lien" upon the insurance policy or seeks to
recover the entire amount due under the policy by virtue of an assign-
ment of such policy, can, in the light of the above discussion, produce no
difference in the result. The Hanna Case,'1 6 on the other hand, is clearly
distinguishable from the Morgan Case and the Schoenholz Case by the
fact that the interpleader proceeding did not fall within the terms of
section 438 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure. Similarly to
the rule laid down in Harris v. Balk it should be held in the instant case,
for the better protection of the absentee, that the insurance company
shall not be privileged to avail itself, with respect to such absentee, of
the judgment and payment thereunder unless it has notified such
14 Supra note 3.
'Under the New York practice, where judgment is given by default against a
non-resident who is served by publication, the plaintiff is required to give an under-
taking for restitution which will protect such absentee if he is subsequently
admitted to defend the action and succeeds in his defence. Code of Civil Proce-
dure, sec. 1216; Rules of Civil Practice, rule 192, subdiv. 5.
Concerning the time within which such absentee may be admitted to defend, see
New York Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 445; Civil Practice Act, sec. 217.
" Supra note 5.
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absentee of the pendency of the action or unless such absentee was
otherwise informed of the proceedings within the statutory period
during which non-resident defendants served by publication may come
in and defend. E.G.L.
TAXATION OF SEATS ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE
The prevailing concept of "property" is often rudely tested in taxa-
tion cases. The rules laid down in statutes and decisions have often
been constructed with the idea that property is a physical res-an
object of sensation. As such, property would always have a "situs" -
a relation in space to other objects of sense. But a chose in action is
also property, although it is not a thing or res-an object of sense.
Our concept of property has shifted; incorporeal rights have become
property.' And finally, "property" has ceased to describe any res,
or object of sense, at all, and has become merely a bundle of legal
relations-rights, powers, privileges, immunities. Such is the case
whether these relations affect the consumption and enjoyment of
some particular object of sense or not.
It appears that the power of a state to levy a tax often depends upon
the "situs" of property. We tax "property" whether it is tangible
or intangible. Whenever the power to tax depends upon situs, we are
compelled to find a situs for that which under accepted definitions
can have none.
In Anderson v. Durr (1921) 42 Sup. Ct. 15,2 the United States
Supreme Court held that a seat on the New York Stock Exchange is
property and may be taxed in Ohio, where its owner lived, without
running counter to the Fourteenth Amendment, in spite of the fact
that it may also be taxed in New York. Mr. Justice Pitney finds that
membership in the Exchange includes the privilege of buying and sell-
ing in the Exchange building; the power of assignment "with quali-
fications"; a contractual right that the business of the association shall
be conducted properly; a right that in dealings with other members
commissions shall be determined by a definite rule; a privilege of
holding oneself out in Ohio as a member and thereby inducing business;
and some interest in the capital stock of a New York corporation own-
ing the land and building in New York City, valued in excess of
A right is never corporeal. Mr. Justice Holmes remarks in his dissent in the
case now under discussion: "All rights are intangible personal relations. .. ."
Anderson v. Durr (1921) 42 Sup. Ct 15, 18. The same shift that occurred as to
"property" no doubt also occurred as to "chose in action." A chose is a thing,
and no doubt chose in action once meant some specific object of sense the possession
and enjoyment of which might necessitate an action at law.
'Afflrming (igi) ioo Ohio St. 251, 126 N. E. 57. See COMMENTS (1920) 29
YALE LAW JouRNAL, 916, discussing the Ohio decision and analysing the "property"
involved.
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$5,o0o,ooo. This valuable taxable property is not wholly situated in
New York. "The membership is personal property, and being without
fixed situs has a taxable situs at the domicil of the owner. Mobilia
sequuntur personam."3
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented in an opinion of one paragraph.4 "The
fact that all rights are intangible personal relations" does not give Ohio
the power to tax either land or personal property "permanently out of
the jurisdiction." He seeks for an " object of the right" and he finds
it in the New York Stock Exchange building. All else is merely inci-
dental to the "right . . . . personally to enter . . . and to do busi-
ness there." Thus the property is "localized in New York. If so, it
does not matter whether it is real or personal property or that it adds to
the owner's credit and facilities in Ohio. The same would be true of
a great estate in New York land."
The analysis adopted by-the majority of the Court indicates that some
of the legal relations of the owner of a seat have no connection with
the New York building as an "object." They do not constitute prop-
erty in the building. The power of Ohio to tax them is scarcely to
be denied merely on the ground that they are "incidental."
A state taxes property because it maintains machinery for determin-
ing the existence of rights and privileges, lending its force and machin-
ery to compel performance by those bearing duties and refusing them
as against those having privileges. We believe that those should pay
who reap the advantage, and that they should pay in proportion to the
number and value of their advantages. Whether in the case of land,
of chattels, or of choses in action, eveyry state holds its machinery ready
for all comers. A resident of Ohio who owns New York land or a
New York chattel or who makes a New York contract has Ohio rights
as well as New York rights, and has Oregon rights as well as Ohio
rights. These various rights (and other relations) are not necessarily
identical in either number or character. Shall each state therefore
have the power to tax? In theory, yes; and the amount of the tax to
be paid each state should be determined by the value received from
each state. Practically, however, such a system would be too compli-
cated and expensive. 5 The states that, in general, render the greatest
'Anderson v. Durr, supra at p. 17.
What are the mobilia in this case and how do they follow the domicil? Do the
New York rights and privileges cross an intervening state and turn into Ohio
rights and privileges? Apparently some of them do not. "Nor is plaintiff's case
stronger if we assume that the membership privileges exercisable locally in New
York enable that State to tax them even as against a resident of Ohio. Exemption
from double taxation by one and the same State is not guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment; much less is taxation by two States upon identical or closely
related property interests falling within the jurisdiction of both, forbidden."
'Ibid. 18. Justices Van Devanter and McReynolds concurring.
"It may seem surprising that a person who has "property" in any one state has
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service are the states where the object or res is located and the state of
the owner's domicil. Upon one or both of these states is conferred the
power to tax, generally to the exclusion of others. The principle upon
which the choice is made is not always obvious to a non-expert.6 The
present decision, giving to both states the power to tax, is not in con-
flict with previous decisions and is not unreasonable.
A. L. C.
AGREEMENTS FOR FICTITIOUS BIDS AT AUCTIONS
The courts generally agree that a puffer at an auction is unworthy
of his hire.' His employment is considered a fraud on honest bid-
ders.2 Thus the general rule is that in a "sale without reserve" the
employment of a puffer renders the sale voidable at the election of
the bona fide purchaser.3 The same result should be reached. in a
"sale to the highest bidder," for at common law it was considered as
a sale without reserve.4 There is a representation to the public that
property in forty states: and it may be disturbing to an already unduly harassed
property owner to be told that there is- a theory by which he may be taxed in forty
jurisdictions. The fact is, however, that the question is merely one of sound social
policy. There may be some comfort in the assurance that there is'still a constitu-
tion, and that the time has not yet arrived when it is regarded as "reactionary"
to believe that confiscation is not sound social policy.
It is not in the least surprising, however, for an Ohio owner of a seat on the
Exchange in New York to learn that he has rights in New York and in Oregon as
well as in Ohio, and that Oregon holds its courts and its united strength ready for
his service in the same way that Ohio does. All that is necessary is that service of
process and other jurisdictional facts should exist. The "rights" recognized and
enforced in Oregon may differ in various respects from those in Ohio and in New
York. For example, New York may have available procedure in rein that is not
available in the other states, and a contract held valid in Ohio may be held invalid
in Oregon. But there is property in each state, even though it is not identically
the same property.
'Thus, bank deposits are taxable in two states, although the depositor has only
a chose in action. Fidelity & C. T. Co. v. Louisville (1917) 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup.
Ct. 40. And although inobilia sequintur personam and are taxable at the owner's
domicil, it seems that they cannot be taxed there if they acquire a "permanent"
location in another state, such "permanency" being possible even though they
remain movable. Union Transit Co. v. Kenticky (19o5) i99 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct.
36. Consider also inheritance and stock transfer taxes.
'Dealy v. Land Co. (1913) 21 Calif. App. 39, 130 Pac. io66; Walker v. Night-
ingale (1726, H. L.) 3 Brown P. C. 263.
2National Bank v. Sprague (i869) 20 N. J. Eq. i59; Veazie v. Williains (i85o,
U. S.) 8 How. 134.
'Howard v. Castle (1796, K. B.) 6 T. R. 642; Thornet v. Haines (1846) 15
L. J. Exch. 23o; Veazie v. Williams, supra note 2; cf. Gregory v. U. S. Fidelity
Co. (1904, Sup. Ct.) 45 Misc. 112, 91 N. Y. Supp. 595. The seller cannot avoid
a sale where he has employed a puffer. Troughton v. Johnson (1804) 3 N. C.
328.
"Benjamin, Sales (6th ed. 192o) 549; Parfitt v. Jepson (1877) L. J. C. P. 529.
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the property shall be sold in a market where free, unhampered com-
petition determines who the purchaser shall be.5 Likewise an agree-
ment between buyers not to bid against each other at a public auction
for the purpose of preventing competition or chilling bidding is illegal,
and for the same reason." The opposite poles of illegality in bidding
are where artificial competition secures a price higher than honest
competition would yield, and where stifled competition secures the
goods for a price lower than an unhampered market would yield.
The dissent from the illegality of either extreme is negligible.
The consideration which moves the few dissenters from the rule
against puffing appears to be a desire to shield the seller of property
from an unjust price.7 Something may be said for this position when
the auction is an involuntary judicial sale.8 It has been suggested
that no matter what interest one may have in the proceeds of the
sale he has a privilege of bidding, provided the sale is not under his
control.' It seems that when he has an interest in the enhancement
of prices, even if he has no control over the sale, his privilege of
bidding could easily be abused and work a fraud upon honest bidders
because he would profit from the running up of the bids. Yet there
are instances in judicial sales where one interested in the sale may
'Veazie v. Williams, supra note 2; McMillan v. Harris (19oo) iio Ga. 72, 35 S.
E. 334; National Bank v. Sprague, supra note 2; Flannery v. Jones (1897) i8o
Pa. 338, 36 At. 856; Peck v. List (1883) 23 W. Va. 338. In England the attend-
ance of bidders at a sale without reserve forms a contract with the auctioneer
that the property will be sold to the highest bidder. Warlow v. Harrison (1858,
Q. B.) i El. & El. 295; cf. McManus v. Fortescue [19o7] 2 K. B. i; see Main-
price v. Westley (1865, Q. B.) 6 B. & S. 419; Anson, Contract (Corbin's ed.
1919) sec. 64; Langdell, Contracts (2d ed. i88o) 24. Doubt has been expressed
of the correctness of this result. Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 29; Smith, Sales
"Without Reserve" (1914) 4o L. MAG. & REv. 173. There is specific legislation
in some American jurisdictions that when a sale is advertised to be without
reserve the auctioneer cannot withdraw the goods from sale. N. D. Comp. Laws,
1913, sec. 5999; S. D. Rev. Code, 1919, sec. 962; Calif. Civ. Code, i9og, sec. 1796;
Uniform Sales Act, sec. 21.
'McMullen v. Hoffman (i898) 174 U. S. 639, 19 Sup. Ct 839; (1921) 30 YALE
LAw JouRxAL, 630; 2o L. R. A. 545, note.
'In Texas the illegality of puffing depends upon the animus with which it is
carried on. Reynolds v. Dechamus (1859) 24 Tex. 174- In Tennessee not only
must the employment of puffers be nmala fide, but in addition it must be shown
that the other bidders were actually deceived. Davis v. Petway (1859, Tenn.) 3
Head, 667; cf. Williams v. Bradley (1871, Tenn.) 7 Heisk. 54. Formerly in
equity, contrary to the rule of law, the employment of one puffer was justifiable
in England to prevent a sacrifice of the property. An Act of Parliament recon-
ciles equity with common law by making puffing illegal in regard to: sales of
land (1867) 30 & 31 Vict. c. 48; goods, Sales of Goods Act (1893) 56 & 57 Vict.
c. 71, sec. 58.
'The court may set a minimum or reserve price. Bofil v. Fisher (i85o, S. C.)
"3 Rich. Eq. I; see Graffam v. Burgess (1885) 117 U. S. i8o, 6 Sup. Ct. 686.
'McMillan v. Harris, supra note 5.
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have a bona fide intent to purchase, and his interest in the sale would
not be antagonistic to his position as an honest bidder.10 Under such
circumstances he would have no inducement to run up the price. How-
ever, it would be only within this small group of judicial sales, where
the sales in a number of instances are involuntary, that the owner or
one interested in the proceeds of the sale could bid in good faith.
There would be no objection to such bidding so long as the bidders
stand on the same footing. The difficulty is in determining the good
faith of these bids.
Outside of judicial sales of this character, such bidding seems gen-
erally to tend toward fraud. The evil of secret fictitious bidding lies
in the deception.11 In any case the owner can expressly reserve a priv-
ilege of bidding, or establish by notice a reserve price, and secure him-
self against a sacrifice.' 2 Protection is given to the owner against com-
binations of bidders to stifle competition, and it follows that bidders
should be protected from the owner's conspiracy against them.
The argument that puffers should be permitted to prevent a sacrifice
of the property meets with the difficulty that "the value of the thing is
what it will bring." A bidder at an auction values the property accord-
'ing to what others offer for it. The owner putting up the property
would have his personal opinion of what the property is worth, but a
better criterion would be the unhampered auction itself. The auction
is the market, and the market value is the highest bid. Here again is
the difficulty of determining the good faith of these puffing bids.
The court was presented with an agreement to enhance bids, and not
a technical "puffing" agreement, in the recent case of Jennings v.
Jennings (1921, N. C.) io8 S. E. 34o. The plaintiff had been a bona
fide bidder, it appears, at a partition sale'3 of land belonging to the wife
and minor son of the defendant; and in return for increasing his bid
to $11,275, in order to persuade bona fide bidders to run up their bids,
the defendant contracted to give him a share of the higher bids. The
"As, for instance, a sale upon dissolution and winding up of a partnership, or
a partition sale where a partner or a co-owner desires bona fide to buy the pro-
perty. Of course where all the partners or co-owners unite in bidding or hiring
others to bid for them, their interest would lie in securing the highest price possi-
ble.and this would rebut the good faith of the bids on their part.
'Pittsburgh Dredging & Construction Co. v. Monongahela & Western Dredg-
ing Co. (195o, C. C. W. D. Pa.) i39 Fed. 78o.
"Parfitt v. Jepson, supra note 4; Uniform Sales Act, sec. 2i; see Thornet v.
Haines, supra note 3.
" The rules applicable to an ordinary auction apply to a partition sale, and to
all judicial sales, except where such sale is specifically authorized to be private.
The only difference which actually exists between an auction and a judicial sale
is that the latter requires the approval of the court. Anderson v. Wis. Cent. Ry.
(9o9) 107 Minn. 296, i2o N. W. 39.
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plaintiff made a still higher bid of $11,830, and sold this bid 4 to a
third party without the knowledge or privity of the defendant. He
sought to recover the stipulated share of the difference between his bid
of $11,275 and the amount of the bid he sold to the third party. If the
plaintiff can be considered a puffer, the whole difficulty is ended. But
assuming that he was not a puffer, is it an instance of an illegal secret
interference to artificially create competition by fictitious bids? It is
to be observed that the plaintiff would have had a refund under his
contract with the owner for a share of any bid which he might have
made, if such bid exceeded $11,275. No bid of his, therefore, above
$11,275 could be cofisidered bona fide. Each bid in excess of the
agreed price was, to the extent of the agreed share of remuneration,
fictitious. In reference to puffing his position was anomalous, 5 for
if his bid had been accepted he could have been compelled to complete
the sale, and still his financial responsibility was less in every case than
that of his fellow bidders. He enjoyed a favor so far as his own lia-
bility was concerned. If the property had been knocked down to a
higher bidder, part of the price paid would have gone to the plaintiff.
The higher the accepted bid of a bona fide bidder, the greater his
reward. It was specifically understood by the parties that the agree-
ment should be kept secret.
The Court was doubtful of the "wisdom and propriety"' of the con-
tract; but since the rights of third parties did not intervene, they
treated the contract as valid and held that the plaintiff by selling his
bid to the party failed to perform his par:t of the contract. He had
defeated the purpose of the contract, namely, a sale to the highest
bidder. There was nowhere in the agreement a prohibition of such
sale by the plaintiff, nor was the aim of the contract stated to be for the
purpose of selling to the highest bidder. Undoubtedly this was the
1' The Court says "he acquired the position of advantage as a bidder, and the
right to sell his bid under the contract .... ." It is well settled that a bid is
only an offer, and may be withdrawn at any time before it is accepted by striking
off the property to the bidder. Payne v. Cave (1789, K. B.) 3 T. R. 148. The
principle applies to judicial sales. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Behnke
(1898) 121 Calif. 339, 53 Pac. 812. The highest bidder at a judicial sale is only
preferred and'has no independent rights. Perry v. Perry (1920) 179 N. C. 445,
1O2 S. E. 772. It does not appear in the instant case that the plaintiff's bid had
been accepted, certainly not confirmed by the Court, for the plaintiff sold out
upon his vendee's threat to raise the bid. It is doubtful if the plaintiff had any-
thing to sell. Where a successful bidder at a judicial sale sold his bid before
confirmation by the court, the sale was held to be void. Camp v. Bruce (1898) 96
Va. 521, 31 S. E. 9o; 16 R. C. L. 75.
"One who makes fictitious bids at an auction is not a puffer, if, in case his bid
is last and highest, he can be compelled, -by the person conducting the sale, to take
and pay for the property. McMillan v. Harris, supra note 5. Puffing and by-
bidding are the same.
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end desired, but it was a part of the contract only by implication. The
sole specific requirement for his performance was to bid a certain price
and as a reward he was to receive a share of all higher bids.
It seems that a better ground for the decision would have been the
illegality of the contract. The fact that the agreement was made for
the purpose of enhancing the bids does not render it less odious than an
agreement to chill bidding. The Court thought it "close akin to the
employment of by-bidders,1 6 which is violative of the implied guaranty
that all bids at public sales are genuine ..... " Both the owner and
the bidders are required to act in good faith.1 7  It does not appear any-
where that the property would have been sacrificed at an unjustly low
price. And while the purpose of the agreement was to increase the
bids at the sale, its effect was to create a false appearance of competi-
tive bidding. 8 In the efiforcement of such an agreement the law
would be the instrument of executing a deceptive design.' 9  Any con-
duct of those engaged in selling or bidding which prevents fair, free,
and open sale is fraudulent and contrary to common morality, square
dealing, and commercial integrity.
The dangers involved in the confiscation of the private property of
the citizens of enemy countries are suggested by the recent disclosures
in connection with the repudiation by China, on her entrance into the
recent war, of the Hu Kuang Railway bonds issued in 19o9 in Germany.
It appears that some of these bonds have reached the hands of citizens
of allied or neutral countries, and a great protest, including a threat
of refusal of future loans to China, has gone up. Possibly some of
these bonds were bought up after 1917 at low prices in the expectation
that China could after all be persuaded to pay them.
H6wever lawless the proceeding of repudiation of bona fide obliga-
tions, China merely anticipated the action of the Great Powers in the
Treaty of Versailles reserving the power, of which France, Great
Britain and in part Italy have already availed themselves, to confiscate
the private property and investments of ex-enemy nationals. Nothing
more subversive of the stability of international commercial relations,
the integrity of investments, the mobility of capital and peaceful devel-
'
6 By-bidding is defined, "Bidding with the connivance or at the request of the
vendor of goods by auction, without an intent to purchase, for the purpose of
obtaining a higher price than would otherwise be obtained." 'i Bouvier, Law
Dictionary (8th ed. 1914) 407.
'
T Barnes v. Mays (i8gi) 88 Ga. 696, 16 S. E. 67; Veazie v. Williams, supra
note 2; Bexwell v. Christie (1776, K. B.) Cowp. 395.
' Cf. Pittsburgh Dredging & Construction Co. v. Monongahela & Western
Dredging Co., supra note ii.
" Ibid.
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opment of international intercourse could have been introduced into a
twentieth century treaty than the provision just mentioned. Yet some
of the men who have most vigorously protested against the confiscatory
acts of China, and of Soviet Russia as well, are among those who sanc-
tioned the confiscation clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. The shoe
is now merely on the other foot. As a matter of fact, the policy of
confiscation of ex-enemy private property, now revived in a stressful
period of mental aberration after a full century of desuetude, is a two-
edged sword, and there is never any assurance that it will always swing
in one direction. With the steady growth in American investments
abroad, it seems hardly conceivable that any respectable opinion in the
United States should be found in approval of the short-sighted policy of
confiscatioff or indefinite retention of ex-enemy private property. The
unfortunate effects of the exploitation of this precedent are incalculable.
American holders of the bonds of and investors in possible enemy
countries are in danger of losing their investments out of hand. Their
chances of recovery of any equivalent will depend upon the success in
arms of their own country. The inconsistency of this position with
any movement for the limitation of armaments will be readily
appreciated.
As if divorce were not scandalously easy to obtain, one wealthy and
irritated wife has sought to oust her clinging spouse from her premises
on the ground that he is a "squatter."' He had exercised the only
remaining privilege of dominion left to the male, the choice of the
matrimonial domicil,2 and had considerately chosen his wife's estate.
The complaint was futile'; Domus sua cuique est tutissimnum refugiumn.
1Marshall v. Marshall (I92I, Co. Ct) I16 Misc. 249, 19o N. Y. Supp. 318.
2Schouler, Domestic Relations (6th ed. i92i) sec. 40; Buckholz v. Buckholz
(i911) 63 Wash. 213, 115 Pac. 88.
' Cipperly v. Cipperly (1g18, Co. Ct) 104 Misc. 434, 172 N. Y. Supp. 351.
